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CHAPTER 10
What Remains of Class Voting?
Nonna Mayer
According to the thesis put forward by the sociologist Seymour M. Lipset in his book, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, the elec-toral game is essentially a ref lection of the class struggle: “In virtually 
every economically developed country, the lower-income groups vote mainly 
for parties of the Left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties 
of the right.”1 However, almost thirty years later he is one of the first people, 
along with Terry Clark, to predict the disappearance of social classes and of 
the privileged link between left-wing parties and people from working-class 
backgrounds.2
The stakes are high. Despite the rise of the middle classes, the so-called 
working classes continue today to represent the majority of the electorate. And 
these are the classes that the radical and populist Extreme-Rights developing 
in Europe today are trying to win over. Does the notion of a “class vote” still 
have meaning? If so, what are the theoretical and empirical bases for it? This 
chapter will address these questions from a comparative perspective, looking 
at France in a European context and paying particular attention to questions 
of definition and measurement. The Marxist approach stresses the position 
of individuals in the process of production, the relationship to capital and 
to work, domination, and conf lict. It sees social classes as collective actors, 
equipped with a class conscience and with political representation. On the 
other hand, the Weberian approach stresses the unequal access of individuals 
to economic, social, and political resources without these latter being nec-
essarily cumulative or producing a sense of class consciousness. Rather than 
classes, it identifies social strata according to their position on scales based on 
income, qualifications, and prestige. These two approaches will be combined 
here, taking both the relationship to the means of work and social position 
into account.
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The Origins of Class Voting
The Sociological Model
Electoral sociology really came into its own in the United States after the Second 
World War with opinion polls and the groundbreaking work of Paul Lazarsfeld 
and his team at Columbia University.3 They carried out a survey to measure 
the impact of the 1940 presidential election among a representative panel of 
inhabitants of Erie County in Ohio. The panel was questioned on seven differ-
ent occasions and the results revealed, to their great surprise, that the electoral 
campaign had only a limited effect on the political choices made. The major-
ity of voters had made their minds up well before the campaign started and 
remained faithful to their initial choices which corresponded to their social and 
professional background. Three variables played a key role: economic and social 
status,4 religion, and place of residence. Three out of four rich protestant farm-
ers voted for the Republican candidate and 90% of the urban Catholic labor 
force voted for the Democratic candidate: “People think, politically, as they 
are, socially. Social characteristics determine political characteristics,” such is 
the main conclusion of their study.5 This sociological model was nonetheless 
rapidly called into question first by researchers at the University of Michigan 
who placed the psychological mechanisms of “party identification” at the heart 
of their model and then by economic approaches to voting. In Europe, on the 
contrary, the idea that politics is the ref lection of social structures imposed itself 
durably both under the inf luence of Marxism and because, unlike American 
parties,6 European parties were built on the bases of class.
This is what Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan showed in their ground-
breaking book, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.7 
They link the genesis of European parties to four basic conf licts. The first two 
are the product of a “nation-building” process which saw the nation-state pro-
gressively impose itself against both local, regional, and linguistic particularities 
(the center-periphery cleavage) and the inf luence and privileges of the Church. 
The second two are the result of the industrial revolution which first opposed 
the rising bourgeois industrial class to landowners and then workers to capitalist 
owners. The sequential interaction between these four cleavages gave birth to the 
partisan and electoral cleavages of today (table 10.1). The political parties were 
seen as agents for the transformation of these social conf licts into long-lasting 
political divisions which they would then contribute to maintaining. The first 
three cleavages gave rise to parties which differed from one country to another 
as the building of the nation-state, the rate of industrialization, the shock of the 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation did not occur at the same time or 
indeed at the same pace. However, the same cleavage along the lines of class was 
to be found everywhere with left-wing parties defending the working classes and 
conservative parties defending the middle and upper classes.
The Working-Class Vote
The English sociologist, Robert Alford measured this “class vote” with the 
help of a simple indicator named after him which was to be used worldwide.8 
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He identified two classes: one made up of workers and one made up of non-
workers. He also identified two types of vote: a left-wing vote (Labor) and a 
right-wing vote (Conservative). The indicator is calculated by subtracting the 
proportion of workers from non-workers who vote Left. If during a given elec-
tion all the workers vote to the Left and none of the non-workers do, the indi-
cator takes on the value of 100 (100%-0%) resulting in a perfect class vote. If 
the proportion of workers and non-workers who vote Left is identical, then the 
index falls to 0 and there is no class vote. Should the proportion of non-workers 
voting to the Left be higher than the number of workers voting Left, then there 
is a negative index or inverse class vote. He compared the results of 53 electoral 
surveys carried out between 1936 and 1962 in the United States, in Britain, in 
Canada, and in Australia and found that the British case, where the index went 
up to + 40 was the purest example of “class voting,” whereas it fell to + 16 in 
the United States and was non-existent in Canada. In their analysis of British 
elections between 1963 and 1970, Butler and Stokes9 confirm the privileged 
bond between British workers in the 1960s and the Labour Party, which was 
seen as the “defender of the workers.”
A similar phenomenon can be observed in France. The non directive inter-
views carried out by Guy Michelat and Michel Simon at the end of the 1960s,10 
reveal two antagonistic sub-cultures: the Catholic sub-culture defined by reli-
gion on the one hand and a non-religious sub-culture of workers defined by 
class antagonism on the other. The latter defined themselves as workers, fight-
ing against capitalist bosses, they believed in the virtues of collective action, 
they preferred left-wing parties and trade unions, above all the Communist 
Party (PC) which was seen as the natural ally of the working “class.” The fol-
lowing interview extract demonstrates this clearly:
It seems to me that any self-respecting worker has to have communist tendencies 
all the same, he has communist ideas—it goes without saying. He is a communist 
sympathiser, necessarily, because he works for a boss, he works for some guy who 
gets rich by the sweat of your brow, automatically you’re a communist, you’re a 
communist sympathiser, that’s all there is to it.”11
Table 10.1 The four stages in the formation of party systems
Cleavage Critical Period Issue
Center/periphery
State/Church
Land/industry
Reformation—
 Counter-reformation: 
 sixteenth–seventeenth centuries
National (French) Revolution:
 post-1789
Industrial Revolution: 
 nineteenth century
National vs. supranational religion; 
 national language vs. Latin
Secular vs. religious control of 
 mass education
Tariff levels for agricultural products;
 Control vs. freedom for industrial
 enterprise
Owner/worker Russian Revolution: 1917 Integration into national 
 polity vs. commitment to international
 revolutionary movement
Source: Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 47.
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Their survey took these results further. The right-wing vote was higher among 
people who practiced a religion. The left-wing vote increased depending on 
the degree of integration in the working class as measured by the number of 
working-class connections or attributes possessed (being a worker oneself, hav-
ing a working-class father or spouse, etc.). It went from 18% amongst women 
who were without any connection to 55% for workers whose fathers were also 
workers. The effects of “objective” social class were seen to combine with those 
of the “subjective” social class, i.e. the class individuals feel they belong to.12 
Identification with the working class increased with the number of working-
class attributes. The communist vote was the most frequent amongst people 
who accumulated objective and subjective belonging to the working class (43%). 
But it was the subjective class which exercised decisive inf luence over political 
choice. Among the people surveyed, those who did not have any attachments 
to the working class but who identified with it nonetheless voted communist 
more often than the working-class sons of workers who did not share this feel-
ing (31% as against 22%).
Using the same categories of cleavages—professional, religious, and territo-
rial—as those highlighted by Lipset and Rokkan, a comparative survey carried 
out by Richard Rose in fifteen countries confirmed the determining inf luence 
of religion and social class on political choice.13 Average variance explained 
by these three factors was 25% with a peak of more than 45% in Austria and 
more than 50% in the Netherlands. The religious variable was top of the list in 
“pillarised”14 countries such as the Netherlands (50%), Belgium (23%), Austria 
(30%) and Catholic countries like Italy (22%) and France (28%). Social class 
had the strongest effect in the Scandinavian countries, with Sweden and 
Finland at 32% followed by Norway and Denmark. On first glance, the results 
seemed to confirm the thesis that cleavages were “frozen” and that the party 
system of the 1960s largely ref lected the structure of cleavages in the 1920s.15
Death and Resurrection of Class Voting
From Cleavage Voting to Issue Voting?
And yet, at the same moment, the first signs that the model was losing impetus 
began to appear. The Alford index which until then supported the thesis of the 
“class vote” was only used from then on by those who announced its decline as 
shown in the diagram below which was printed in a great number of publica-
tions (figure 10.1). This phenomenon varied from one country to another. The 
fall of the index was particularly precocious and brutal in the United States, 
gradual in France and late and relatively limited in Sweden where in 1985 
the Alford index still reached + 35. However, the shape of the curves in the 
graph was generally the same, seeming to prefigure the disappearance of class 
voting.
During the same period, electoral “volatility” seemed to be on the rise. This 
was true whether it was measured at the level of individuals by tracing their elec-
toral itinerary through opinion polls or at a collective party level by calculating 
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the gains accumulated by all parties between two consecutive national elec-
tions.16 The trend was toward electoral de-alignment,17 and toward a question-
ing among voters of their usual habit of voting for the party assimilated to their 
class or religious preference.
This decline in the link between social and political cleavages is generally 
associated with changes brought about by the shift from the industrial to the 
postindustrial society that modified the balance between classes and the way 
people relate to politics. The fact that the economy became so much more 
service oriented reduced the number of workers to the benefit of the middle 
classes and white-collar workers. Economic growth, improvements in stan-
dards of living, and the fact that they could buy their own home made workers 
more individualistic and less concerned about solidarity. In parallel to their 
“embourgeoisement”18 the “proletarisation” of routine non manual employees 
and a subsequent blurring of class borders could also be observed. More gener-
ally, the rising levels of education and particularly of higher education, the role 
of the media, the rise in “post-materialist” hedonistic and anti-authoritarian 
values theorized by the American sociologist, Ronald Inglehart,19 are all fac-
tors which have encouraged the political emancipation of individuals. Better 
informed, more politically aware, they have become less dependent on political 
parties and better able to make up their minds depending on issues specific 
to the election and to the candidates presented. The individual has become 
“individualistic,” “rational,”20, “able to choose.”21 In the long run, “issue vot-
ing” would compete with the religious or socio-professional based “cleavage 
voting.”22 Finally, the political supply, the parties on offer changed. These 
same post-materialist values were shaking up the system of party alignment, 
giving rise to new demands which had not been taken into account and favor-
ing the emergence of new left-wing parties (ecologists and alternatives). They 
also encouraged the emergence of Extreme-Right and populist parties23 in 
reaction to a society judged to be too permissive and too open. The old parties 
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Figure 10.1 Changes in the Alford Index
Source: Clark et al., 1993.
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themselves reinforced the decline of the class vote by changing their political 
discourse to widen their electoral base, thereby running the risk of losing their 
initial electorate. By opening up to the middle classes and by focusing on post-
materialist issues, the working-class parties in particular blurred their image 
and lost some of their power of attraction among workers.
There are two variants of the thesis according to which class voting is declin-
ing. According to the first, socio-professional cleavages do not disappear: they 
change. Quite a lot of work has been done analyzing the fragmentation of the 
British working class, contrasting the old industrial working class of northern 
England and Scotland with a new class in the south of the country. This new 
class was better qualified, better off, worked in light industry, had developed 
a more instrumental and less collective vision of the trade unions and of pol-
itics and was more interested in the private sphere of activity. Dunleavy and 
Husbands24 developed this distinction between public and private sector work-
ers which also distinguished between consumers of public goods (social hous-
ing, public transport, and state health care) and consumers of private goods 
(car ownership, private housing, private health care). The first group tend to 
vote Labor and the second Conservative. Other authors pointed out the cleav-
ages linked to education and the shift toward the Left of the new middle classes 
who had knowledge but not power and who were particularly sensitive to post-
materialist issues, leaning toward the new left-wing parties.25 The other variant 
argued that social and professional cleavages were declining. According to this 
view, political cleavages today are drawn only around post-materialist issues 
and values.26 It argued that belonging to a given generation, gender, and eth-
nic identity have become increasingly important when deciding how to vote, 
transcending the barriers of class.
The Indicators Battle
However, these results were rapidly called into question because of weaknesses 
in their methodological bases. Results always depend of course on how the 
measures are taken. Having studied 300 elections in 12 European countries 
taking place over a century, Bartolini and Mair27 support the opposite thesis: 
in the long term, it is electoral stability which dominates with the volatility 
observed being an optical illusion resulting from the fact that the period stud-
ied was too recent and also from the indicators used. If the notion of cleavage 
is studied with rigor, if one reasons in the long term starting with the end of 
the nineteenth century, if one retains only the volatility between blocks rather 
than movement within each camp then electoral mobility seems much stronger 
during the inter-war period.
The Alford index was the one to receive most criticism for a number of 
reasons. It doesn’t take variations in numbers within each class over time and 
within the electorates considered into account. Nor does it take into account 
the complexity of social structure in postindustrial society which can not be 
reduced to two classes. Finally, it does not take account of the complexity of 
the political landscape and especially within multi-party systems. Using more 
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sophisticated statistical methods together with more finely tuned and more 
subtle socio-professional and political divisions, other research has put the 
decline of the class vote into perspective. In England, Anthony Heath and his 
colleagues at Oxford28 carried out research using loglinear models based on the 
calculation of odds ratios. The odds of workers having voted Left rather than 
Right (OL/OR) is related to the odds of non-workers having voted Left rather 
than Right (ŌL/ŌR). The further the value is from 1, the stronger the class 
effect is. Rather than confining themselves to the worker/non-worker dichot-
omy, the authors returned to the more elaborate classification put forward by 
John Goldthorpe and Robert Erikson.29 This classification takes account of the 
degree of autonomy in the workplace, the level of expertise and the exercise of 
authority to distinguish the service class from routine non manual employees 
and manual workers. They conclude that, in England, there is no linear decline 
in class voting but rather “trendless f luctuations” where class voting decreased 
between 1964 and 1979 and then rose again. The specific context of each elec-
tion must be taken into account, the decline in the working-class vote, for 
example, usually sanctions a long period of Labour government.
The most sophisticated model is the one proposed by Michael Hout, Jeff 
Manza, and Clem Brooks30 in their analysis of class voting in the United States. 
Using presidential elections between 1948 and 1992 they measure what they 
call, “the total class vote” as opposed to the “traditional class vote” as measured 
by the Alford index. They take account of all possible electoral choices includ-
ing abstention and ballots for independent candidates. They distinguish six 
socio-professional categories, based on Goldthorpe’s classification and they use 
a synthetic indicator, the kappa index which summarizes a series of multino-
mial logistic regressions. They conclude that class voting has not disappeared 
in the United States. On the other hand, important realignments have taken 
place as workers have detached themselves form the Democratic Party, com-
pany owners have stressed their support for the Republicans and professionals 
and managers31 have shifted toward the Democrats.
The controversy has not yet been settled as Geoffrey Evans’ collective book 
illustrates,32 bringing together fervent opponents and defenders of the class 
vote thesis, all of them camping on their own positions.33 More recently, the 
major studies of Knutsen34 and Thomassen35 reassess transformations in cleav-
age voting in Europe and Jeroen Van de Waal, Peter Achterberg, and Dick 
Houtman even conclude that there has been a revival of class voting, drawing 
from the data of the International Social Mobility and Politics File.36
France in the European Mirror
In the light of these debates, the major electoral surveys carried out at the 
Cevipof enable an in-depth study of change in class voting in France from the 
presidential election of 1978 to the 200237 presidential election to be under-
taken. During this period, social structure changed enormously.38 The overall 
level of qualifications rose. From 1980 to 2002 the proportion of young people 
aged 20–24 in higher education increased from 18% to 43%. The proportion 
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of self-employed receded. Farmers represented 20% of the active population 
in 1954 and less than 5% in 2002 and the share of artisans and shopkeepers 
dropped from 12% to 5%. The proportion of workers fell from more than 30% 
to 25%, while the number of routine non-manual employees doubled to reach 
30%. The number of people in the upper service class quadrupled and the 
lower service class doubled. Today, taken as a whole, professionals and manag-
ers make up one third of the workforce. Finally, mass unemployment, mostly 
affecting routine non manual employees and workers began in 1974 and varied 
between 8% and 12% throughout the period as against less than 2% in the 
1960s. This was also a politically volatile period which witnessed the arrival of 
the Left in power followed by its defeat, the implantation of the Front National 
(FN) in the French political landscape, the return of the Left as a result of the 
surprise dissolution in 1997, three periods of cohabitation, and the return of 
the Right as a result of the political “earthquake” on the April 21, 2002, when 
Jean-Marie Le Pen beat the socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin in the first round 
of the presidential election thus qualifying for the second round.
Two indicators of social class were used. The first of these was the inter-
viewee’s occupation using the INSEE’s nomenclature of six socio-professional 
groups (SPG) which is quite similar to Goldthorpe and Erikson’s classification 
(table 10.2). The second indicator used was the socio-professional status which 
distinguishes between the self-employed and employees who work for a boss. 
This includes both public sector employees whose employer is the state and 
private sector employees. The unemployed, retirees and women who have given 
up paid employment were reclassified according to their last job, the effects of 
the professional background on electoral behavior being prolonged beyond the 
temporary or definitive cessation of activity. Lastly, on the political front, the 
emergence of the Front National was taken into account and a distinction was 
made between votes for the Left, the Center-Right, and the Extreme-Right.
Class Dealignments and Realignments
During the period studied, the privileged bonds between workers and left-wing 
parties were effectively eroded (table 10.3). In 1978, seven out of ten workers 
voted for them.
In 2002, only 43% of them did so. Although the left-wing vote remained the 
largest among them, the gap with non-worker employees practically disappeared. 
Table 10.2 Correspondence between Goldthorpe’s and the INSEE’s classification
Goldthorpe and Erikson (1992) The INSEE’s Socio-professional Groups
Self-employed
Upper service class
Lower service class
Routine non-manual employees
Agriculteurs, commerçants, artisans
Cadres, professions intellectuelles supérieures, 
 chefs d’entreprise
Professions intermédiaires
Employés
Skilled workers, unskilled workers Ouvriers
Source: Cevipof post-electoral surveys and the French Electoral Panel, 2002.
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The Alford index which was at 23 in 1978 was at zero in 2002. This receding 
of the Left was linked to transformations within the working-class landscape 
which was greatly affected by industrial restructuring and unemployment. 
This partly benefited the Front National. It obtained its highest score from 
workers in the 1995 presidential election or more precisely from those workers 
who did actually vote as the abstention rate was highest39 amongst this sec-
tion of the electorate. Between 1978 and 2002, the total number of votes cast 
by workers for the Extreme-Right increased from 1% to 26%. Harnessing the 
disappointment aroused by the arrival of the Socialists in power in 1981, the 
FN portrayed itself as the privileged defender of the little guy against the great 
and powerful, the people against the elites. Conversely, the salaried middle 
classes—a category with a high proportion of young people, urban dwellers, 
well-educated people, non church goers, and sensitive to post-1968 values—
moved closer to the Left and in particular to the Socialist Party which had 
been renovated in 1971. This switching of political allegiances drew the new 
socio-professional cleavages.
The first of these distinguishes between employees and the self-employed. 
Four out of five of the latter prefer the right-wing to left-wing parties who, to 
their minds, defend employees against owners and reinforce state interven-
tion in economic life. In 2002, the level of left-wing votes among the two 
groups was still separated by 23 points as against 32 in 1978 (table 10.3). A 
second cleavage has appeared between private and public sector employees. 
The latter are more likely to vote Left that has remained the dominant political 
force amongst them throughout the period studied. During the same period, 
Table 10.3 The left-wing vote by socio-professional group and status (%)
Leg. election 
1978
Pres. election 
1988
Pres. election 
1995
Leg. election 
1997
Pres. election 
2002
Socio-professional group
Farmers
Owners
Executives and Managers
Mid-level employees
Routine non manual 
 employees
Workers
26
31
45
57
54
70
29
32
41
48
52
63
20
19
46
45
38
49
27
31
46
51
52
52
18
20
43
50
39
43
Alford Index 23 18 11 5 0
Status
Self-employed
Salaried 
28
60
30
54
22
44
29
51
21
44
Gap 32 24 22 22 23
Sector
Private
Public
58
64
52
58
40
52
47
57
39
51
Gap 6 6 12 10 12
Total
Numbers
53
3,867
49
3,091
41
3,149
48
1,963
43
2,826
Source: Cevipof post-electoral surveys and the French Electoral Panel, 2002.
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the Left receded among private sector employees who tend to be more recep-
tive to either Le Pen type political messages (workers and routine non manual 
employees) or messages from the Center Right (managers and professionals). 
The gap between the two groups has risen from 6 points in 1978 to 12 points 
since 1995. The persistence of unemployment, which has affected private sector 
employees massively, has made them see public sector employees as privileged 
as they have guaranteed jobs and better pension schemes. In the meantime, the 
latter are fearful of the economic liberalism of the Right and the risks of dereg-
ulation associated with the building of the European Union. Socio-professional 
cleavages have shifted. However, they have not disappeared.
A correspondence factor analysis allows these transformations to be visual-
ized more synthetically (figure 10.2). This is done by projecting the six socio-
professional groups onto the political landscape and following their movements 
in time from one election to another.40 Three phenomena clearly appear. 
Workers have progressively moved toward the center of the graph, shifting away 
from their initial anchoring on the Left. Managers and the upper service class, 
on the other hand, have moved away from the Right. A loglinear model of these 
different parameters41 confirms the hypothesis of a transformation and not the 
disappearance of class voting. To the de-alignment of workers corresponds a 
realignment of mid-level employees toward the Left and of the self-employed 
toward the Right.
The Perturbing Effect of the Front National
The only exception to this rule is the vote for the Front National which brings 
yesterday’s class enemies—workers and small business owners—into the same 
camp through their rejection of immigrants.42 This blurring of boundaries 
Factor 2 - 28.49%
Factor 1 - 71.51%
Workers 1988
Workers 1979
Mid-level 1978
0.2
0.15
0
−0.15
−0.30
−0.45
0 −0.2 −0.4
Clerical 1978
Managers 1978
Managers 1997
Managers 2002
Managers 1995
Mid-level 2002
Left
Clerical 1997
Clerical 1988
Clerical 2002
Clerical 1995
Extreme Right
Shopkeepers 1988
Shopkeepers 1995
Workers 1997
Workers 2002
Workers 1995
Mid-level 1988
Mid-level 1995
Mid-level 1997
Managers 1988
Farmers 1997
Shopkeepers 1978
Farmers 1988
Farmers 1995
Farmers 2002
Shopkeepers 2002Shopkeepers 1997
Right
Figure 10.2 Changes in the vote by socio-professional group in France 1978–2002
Source: Cevipof post-electoral surveys and the French Electoral Panel, 2002 (Cautrès and Mayer, 2004, p. 154).
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intensified again during the 2002 presidential election, when for the first time 
the FN leader made advances in rural and agricultural areas. The level of the Le 
Pen vote is identical among farmers, company owners, non manual employees 
and workers. The only categories to resist his inf luence are executives and man-
agers (table 10.4). The specific nature of the Le Pen vote is confirmed by taking 
the different parameters likely to explain the vote into account.43
Religion and socio-professional status (self-employed, public sector employee, 
private sector employee) remain the best predictors of choice between left- and 
right-wing candidates in the first round. The same can not be said for the 
Extreme-Right. In this case, it is no longer the socio-professional status which 
counts but the level of education and the sex of the voter. Whatever their age, 
less well-educated voters gave their vote more often to Le Pen or Mégret on 
April 21, and men much more willingly than women. If women had been the 
only ones to vote on that day, Le Pen would have been in third position after 
Jospin and Chirac. If only men had voted, Le Pen would have taken first place, 
in front of Chirac and Jospin. The simplistic discourse of the Front National 
which makes immigrants the single cause of all problems in France today, and 
“national preference,” the miracle remedy for unemployment, is more readily 
listened to among the less well educated. Added to this, the physical and verbal 
violence that surrounds Le Pen rebuffs female voters, as does the traditional 
image of the woman at home which he conveys.
The Front National therefore appears to be a perturbing element in the 
French political landscape, bringing together a composite electorate by means 
of the federating issue of immigration. Whatever the election, this is the prob-
lem which together with insecurity is the primary motivation for this elector-
ate. This is quite clearly a cross-cleavage and cross-class issue vote.
European Electoral Tendencies
The first wave of the European social survey was carried out late 2002, early 
2003 in around 20 countries including France. It provided an opportunity to 
compare the French situation to what was happening in other European coun-
tries. There already exist several comparative studies on electoral cleavages. The 
one which Jacques Thomassen directed recently on the European voter, using 
the European electoral survey data bank of the International Committee for 
Table 10.4 The Le Pen vote by socio-professional group (%)
Socio-professional group 1998 1995 2002 Gap
Farmers
Owners
Executives and Managers
Mid-level employees
Routine non manual employees
Workers
10
19
14
15
14
17
10
19
4
14
18
21
22
22
13
11
22
23
12
3
–1
–4
8
6
Source: Cevipof post-electoral surveys and the Panel électoral français, 2002.
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Research into Elections and Representative Democracy (ICORE),44 confirms a 
general weakening of the relationship between party choice and class member-
ship. However, he confines himself to the six countries for which comparable 
data since the 1960s are available: Denmark, (West) Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Oddjborn Knutsen’s study,45 using 
several Eurobarometers waves (1975–1997), includes France alongside Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
Knutsen keeps to the Left-Right dichotomy using the whole range of class vote 
indicators to show how it reached its highest level in Denmark and its lowest 
in Italy and Germany. During the period under study, it declined overall by 
35% (Kappa index) to 47% (Alford index) on average. The decline was high-
est in Denmark and the Netherlands, insignificant in Germany and middling 
in France. Using the ESS survey, this analysis can be continued. Our socio-
 professional indicator comes close to John Goldthorpe and Robert Erikson’s 
categorization (table 10.2), distinguishing four groups of employees from execu-
tives and managers to workers and classifying the self-employed separately.46 
The second indicator used is the status divided into three positions distinguish-
ing between self-employed workers and public and private sector employees.47 
The electoral indicator used is the reconstitution of the votes in the last national 
election. The question was often asked several months after the election and 
is understood here essentially as an indicator of political position. It correlates 
to the position on a Left-Right scale and degree of party alignment. France is 
compared to two countries where class voting was particularly high, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, to Germany where it was particularly low and to Spain, a 
southern country where industrialization is more recent.
In three of these five countries, it can be observed that the level of left-wing 
voting—the ecologists are included here—increases regularly as one goes down 
the social scale: from company owners to senior and mid-level executives, then 
to clerical and sales staff, reaching its maximum among workers. In Sweden and 
the United Kingdom in particular, almost three quarters of workers say they 
voted Left and 60% do so in Spain where the group is the largest48 (table 10.5). 
In France, on the other hand, the working-class exception is no more. There 
is no longer any difference between the level of left-wing votes among work-
ers, non manual employees and mid-level employees. Finally in Germany, the 
Alford index is negative. The left-wing vote is higher among mid-level employ-
ees and executives and managers than among workers as had been observed in 
France right after the 2002 presidential election (table 10.3). But if the relation-
ship to the means of production is taken as an indicator contrasting employees 
as a whole to the self-employed, the class vote clearly remains. In all five coun-
tries, including Germany, the fact of being self-employed clearly decreases the 
likelihood of a left-wing vote.
Finally, the cleavage between public and private sector employees is really 
strong only in France (the gap in the level of left-wing voting among the two 
groups stands at 14 points) where debate on maintaining public service has 
been particularly intense and to a lesser extent in Germany. It is inexistent 
elsewhere.
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These results are based on the reconstitution of past votes whose unreliabil-
ity is well known and on a simplified socio-professional nomenclature which 
limits the comparison. They need to be completed by national electoral surveys 
using much more detailed social and political indicators and notably questions 
on feelings of belonging to a given class. They show nonetheless that “class 
voting” continues to exist but in other forms. The main cleavages highlighted 
by Lipset and Rokkan have not disappeared. They have softened and shifted 
as a result of change in socio-professional structures and in the party system. 
This has varied greatly from one country to another. Overall, the link between 
belonging to the working class and voting to the Left has declined everywhere 
though it nonetheless remains strong in Sweden and more generally in the 
Scandinavian countries and in Britain (Table 10.5). On the other hand, from an 
electoral point of view, the Left has made progress amongst non working-class 
employees and has broadened its base beyond its habitual electorate amongst 
clerical and sales staff and mid-level employees. This can be read in either of 
two ways, as a class de-alignment but also as a class realignment. It can also 
be read as a wider opposition between the self-employed, who answer only to 
themselves and employees who are dependant on a boss. In other words, the 
socio-professional category one belongs to continues to be a factor in deter-
mining whether one votes Left or Right and more so than income or level of 
qualification.49
However, it is equally obvious that mid-level employees do not make up a 
class in the same way that yesterday’s workers did. Some of them at least—and 
in particular industrial workers who worked for large companies and lived in 
the same social housing areas—had a strong professional identity and a class 
culture which meant they leaned toward the left-wing unions and parties, and 
in particular the Communist Party. The world of non working-class employees 
seems much more fragmented and the notion of “middle” class less a mobilizing 
Table 10.5 Left-wing vote by socio-professional group and by country (%)
GE SP FR UK SW
Socio-professional group
Self-employed
Executives and managers, Liberal professions
Mid-level employees
Routine non manual employees
Workers
33
58
68
55
55
31
34
41
53
60
37
50
58
58
57
56
63
63
63
74
40
48
55
65
74
Alford Index –1 18 4 12 18
Status
Self-employed
Salaried
33
59
31
54
37
56
56
66
40
62
Gap 26 23 19 11 22
Sector
Private
Public
57
65
54
54
51
65
66
65
61
64
Gap 9 0 14 –1 3
Source: ESS survey, 2003.
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force. As for the parties, they refer less and less to the notion of class and in 
this way contribute themselves to untying the links between social classes and 
votes.
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